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Germany’s Western Front
Translations from the German Official 
History of the Great War
Editor’s Note: Germany’s Western Front, edited by Mark Osborne Humphries and John Maker, is a multi-volume 
English-language translation of Der Weltkrieg, the German official history of the First World War. Originally produced 
between 1925 and 1944 using classified archival records that were destroyed in the aftermath of the Second World War, Der 
Weltkrieg is the untold story of German experience on the Western Front. What follows in the foreword, written by Hew 
Strachen, to the 1915 volume of the series.
© Canadian Military History, Volume 19, Number 2, Spring 2010, pp.71-75.
Foreword
by Hew Strachan
War is a reactive business, a competition whose outcome 
is dependent not on some sort of 
absolute standard of excellence 
on the part of one side, but on the 
relative superiority of one side over 
another. It is this relationship, the 
dynamic between two opponents as 
each struggles to impose its will on 
the other, that should be at the heart 
of operational military history. But 
it rarely is. Military history, for all 
its massive progress in the last two 
or three decades, particularly in the 
English speaking world, remains far 
too national – and even nationalistic 
– in its approach. If the serious 
study of military history as a self-
contained subject has a significant 
agenda for the future, it is this – to 
be comparative.
 For no war and no front is this 
injunction more important or more 
pressing than it is for the First World 
War and its western front. The cycle 
of reaction and reaction between 
two coalitions, remarkably similar 
in their military organisations and 
in the technologies they employed, 
produced a conflict that was not as 
static as the immobility of the trenches 
which dominated the character of the 
fighting suggested. It has now become 
axiomatic that “modern war” was 
conceived and developed through the 
experience of this titanic fight, and 
the lessons which it bequeathed. But 
the military history on which such 
arguments rest continue to be lop-
sided. English-language historians, 
not just Britons but also Americans, 
Australians, Canadians and New 
Zealanders, have done more than 
those writing in French and German 
to deepen our understanding of the 
conduct of operations on the western 
front. However, their research is too 
often written from the perspective 
of one side only. It pays little or no 
attention to the sources available 
for the Germans, for what they 
tell us about German intentions, 
German reactions, or even German 
perspectives on British or French 
efforts.
 T h e  g a p  i s  a l l  t h e  m o r e 
extraordinary as the German official 
history of the war on land, Der 
Weltkrieg, is not a rare set of volumes, 
at least for the war up to the spring 
of 1917, a point it had reached with 
volume 12, published in 1939. By 
then the pace of its authors was 
quickening: the events of 1914 had 
taken six volumes, those of 1915 
three (and these are the basis for 
this translation), and of 1916 two. 
Two more volumes appeared to take 
the story to November 1918. Being 
completed during the Second World 
War, volumes 13 and 14 never gained 
a wide circulation. Five hundred 
copies of each were reprinted in 1956, 
but they did not sell out until 1975. 
 Such disappointing sales were 
themselves indications of two 
phenomena. First, the Second World 
War had made the study of the First 
World War deeply unfashionable 
throughout Europe, a trend that 
only changed in Britain in 1964, 
after the fiftieth anniversary of the 
war’s outbreak, and in Germany 
not until the ninetieth anniversary 
in 2004 – if then. Second, German 
military history after 1945, in so far 
as it survived at all, stepped away 
from the operational focus embraced 
by the general staff historians of 
the Wilhelmine period and of 
which Der Weltkrieg was the final 
manifestation. This condition still 
pertains: operational military history 
does not have the respectability in 
German academic circles which it has 
now acquired in the English-speaking 
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historians of the Reichsarchiv, the 
organisation set up in 1919 to produce 
the German official history, were as 
thorough in their construction of the 
operational story. The first head of 
Reichsarchiv’s section for the collection 
of documents, Theodor Jochim, 
distinguished its work from that of 
academic historians, contending that, 
“The events of the war, strategy and 
tactics can only be considered from a 
neutral, purely objective perspective 
which weighs things dispassionately 
and is independent of any ideology.”
 The Nazis’ rise to power in 1933 
would test this resolve. Volume 9, 
parts of which are included in the 
present translation, was published 
in 1933, and so was the last to appear 
under the old regime. The president 
of the Reichsarchiv in that year, Hans 
von Haeften, resisted flying the 
swastika flag over the office building. 
In 1934 the Reichsarchiv, which even 
though staffed by former army 
officers had thus far remained an 
independent body at least in name, 
world. The British official history has 
been reprinted, the German has not 
been, despite the scarcity of volumes 
13 and 14.
 These two arguments may be 
sufficient explanations for the neglect 
of the Der Weltkrieg in Germany, 
but they do not apply to English-
speaking historians. Their reasons for 
not consulting it more frequently are, 
presumably, linguistic. For monoglot 
scholars, this translation will be a 
boon beyond measure. It has 
been fashionable to rubbish the 
work of the official historians 
of the First World War of all 
languages. Sir James Edmonds, 
whose labours on behalf of 
Britain were not completed 
until 1948, and who has been 
criticised by David French, Tim 
Travers and Denis Winter, to 
cite three historians with very 
different perspectives, presided 
over an enterprise which 
may not conform to current 
expectations of historians, but 
which strove hard for objectivity. 
As Andrew Green has shown 
in Writing the Great War: Sir 
James Edmonds and the Official 
Histories 1915-1948  (2003), 
this was team writing avant 
la lettre. Draft narratives were 
compiled from the documents 
and were then circulated to the 
surviving participants for their 
comments in the search for 
balance. Edmonds’s creation could 
lay much greater claim to unbiased 
authority than could – say – Basil 
Liddell Hart’s The Real War, probably 
the most widely read one-volume 
account of the war in the English 
language between 1930 and 1964. 
Markus Pöhlmann has produced a 
study comparable to Green’s on the 
writing of Der Weltkrieg, to which 
this foreword is heavily indebted. 
Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: 
der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche 
deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung 
1914-1956 (2002) shows that the 
was subordinated to the Wehrmacht. 
It is has therefore been easy to 
condemn the later volumes of Der 
Weltkrieg as ideologically tainted. 
But this is both to exaggerate the 
effect of the Nazis on the writing of 
the history and at the same time to 
underplay a pre-existing issue whose 
roots date back not to Weimar but to 
Wilhelmine Germany.
 After  1933 ,  Jochim’s  goal 
remained the guiding principle 
for  the  h is tor ians  of  the 
Wehrmacht as it had been for 
those of the Reichsarchiv. Their 
careers were formed under 
the Hohenzollerns, and their 
function within the army, as it 
had been for the historians of 
the Prussian general staff, was 
not only to record but also to 
teach. Military history enabled 
officers of the future to learn 
from the examples of the past; 
they would not do so if mistakes 
committed by their predecessors 
were glossed over. Der Weltkrieg 
did not set out specifically to 
glorify the German soldier. His 
heroism in front-line combat 
was the subject of a separate, 
more popular series edited by 
Georg Soldan. Schlachten des 
Weltkrieges covered individual 
battles in a run of 36 much 
slimmer volumes, the last of 
them published in 1930, three 
years before Hitler came to 
power. What did affect the writing of 
Der Weltkrieg was the course of Nazi 
foreign policy. The Reichsarchiv had 
established working relationships 
with the official historians of other 
powers, especially Britain. But 
contacts with the Soviet Union, 
which had provided training areas 
for the Reichswehr in the late 1920s, 
were broken after 1933, and the 
comparative input available for the 
earlier volumes began to wither. 
During the Second World War itself, 
volume 14 – dealing with the events 
of 1918 – was censored for fear of 
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upsetting Romania (Germany’s ally 
in the Second World War, if not in 
the First) and Bulgaria (an ally in 
both wars). These political pressures 
therefore drove the German official 
historians even more to a purely 
military narrative of events.
 This focus on military history 
narrowly defined was a product 
not of Nazi rule but of a much 
older tradition in German military 
thought, to be found in the quarter 
century before the outbreak of 
the First World War in the 
famous dispute between Hans 
Delbrück, professor of history 
in Berlin, and the military 
historians of the general staff. 
Delbrück argued that Frederick 
the Great in the Seven Years 
War (1756-1763) had adopted 
a strategy of attrition, designed 
to wear out the coalition of 
France, Austria and Russia 
by manoeuvre, whereas the 
staff historians said Frederick’s 
strategy was one of annihilation, 
using manoeuvre to seek battle. 
Both were right, because for 
each the focus of attention was a 
different level of war. Delbrück 
was concerned to put war in 
its political context; the staff 
historians were considering 
the operational aspects, the 
relationship between strategy 
and tactics. So determined were 
they that the conduct of war could be 
separated from its political objectives 
that they could not even see the point 
of Delbrück’s argument. Aspects of 
the dispute with Delbrück lingered 
on after the war, until his death 
in 1929. Delbrück was one of ten 
academics appointed to the historical 
commission to oversee the work of 
the Reichsarchiv, the bulk of them 
in favour of putting the war in its 
political context. They were not 
helped when the foreign ministry 
refused to cooperate as it wanted 
to produce its own story, the better 
to rebut the terms of the Versailles 
treaty of 1919. This suited the general 
staff historians, who by 1923 had 
established virtual control of the 
entire project, convinced that they 
could produce an adequate history of 
the war that was almost exclusively 
military in its focus.
 Their hopes rested on an illusion: 
Der Weltkrieg could not in fact be 
apolitical. German officers – like those 
of many other armies – were wont to 
protest their political neutrality, Hans 
von Seeckt, the head of the surrogate 
general staff between 1919 and 1926, 
providing a case in point. But both 
the German army and its chief of 
the general staff had too great a 
professional role in shaping German 
policy for that to be a deliverable 
aspiration. Germany had been united 
by war and its subsequent history 
until 1945 was shaped by it. The 
focus on operations carried its own 
implications for the formulation of 
German strategy between 1870 and 
1945: operational excellence came 
to be seen as the tool which could 
cut through Germany’s problems, 
its encircled position in Europe, its 
quantitative inferiority in the First 
World War, and its “humiliation” at 
the peace of Versailles in 1919. The 
presumption in the didactic purpose 
of Der Weltkrieg was that there was a 
perfect solution to the conundrums 
of operations, that strategy and 
even policy could be subordinated 
to the operational level of war, and 
that a war conducted as the military 
experts thought it should be waged 
would produce the right outcome for 
Germany.
 Erich von Falkenhayn, the 
chief of the general staff between 
September 1914 and August 
1916, and therefore the central 
character in this book, became a 
prime target for the historians of 
the Reichsarchiv. Having served 
in China before the First World 
War, his career had not been 
shaped by Alfred von Schlieffen, 
the chief of the general staff 
between 1891 and 1905, and the 
principal architect of the army’s 
approach to the operational 
level  of  war before 1914. 
Falkenhayn’s overseas service 
had convinced him that Britain’s 
maritime and imperial strength 
made it the centre of gravity 
of the enemy coalition, and 
that therefore it should be the 
focus of Germany’s war effort. 
In the bitter debates between 
“easterners” and “westerners” 
(to borrow the vocabulary of the 
British memoirs of the wars and 
apply it to a more apposite context), 
Falkenhayn focused on the west 
because he realised that ultimately 
French and Russian capacity to carry 
on fighting rested on British economic 
strength. The trouble was that there 
was no operational solution to this 
strategic conundrum, as Britain’s 
forte was naval and Germany’s 
military. Joint planning was in 
any case a casualty of institutional 
division, since Falkenhayn as a 
soldier had no leverage over the 
navy. The best he could hope for 
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was to bring the war to a satisfactory 
conclusion before Britain deployed 
its “New Armies” to France. Unlike 
Schlieffen’s, his solutions were not 
primarily operational, but political. 
He wanted a separate peace with 
Russia to free up the German army 
to concentrate in the west. This is 
the underlying thread of volumes 7, 
8, 9 of Der Weltkrieg, whose sections 
relevant to the western front are here 
published in English for the first time.
 Falkenhayn’s  grasp of  the 
wider strategy imposed on 
Germany was not compatible 
with his own staff’s focus on 
the operational level. Even 
his friends, such as Wild von 
Hohenborn, who succeeded 
him as Prussian minister of war, 
were not persuaded. Like the 
victors of Tannenberg in 1914, 
Paul von Hindenburg and Erich 
Ludendorff, they could see the 
opportunity for operational 
success in the east. Envelopment 
battles of the sort so strongly 
advocated before the war by 
Schlieffen (who was now dead) 
could be carried through against 
Russia. Hans von Haeften, who 
had enjoyed a key role in the 
work of the Reichsarchiv since 
its inception, was appointed its 
president in 1931, and oversaw 
the production of volumes 7, 8, 
and 9 of Der Weltkrieg. He was 
not as unbiased in his views 
as the standards demanded by 
Jochim suggested he should be. 
Heart problems had meant that he 
had had to forego active operational 
appointments on the general staff 
in November 1914. Instead he had 
become adjutant to Helmuth von 
Moltke the younger, Schlieffen’s 
successor and the chief of the general 
staff at the outbreak of war. Moltke 
became the scapegoat for the defeat 
on the Marne in September 1914, and 
thereafter stirred the opposition to 
Falkenhayn, who had replaced him. 
Haeften began work on a history 
of the eastern front even while the 
events described in this volume were 
unfolding. Shuttling back and forth 
to the east, visiting the headquarters 
of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 
he became such a fierce critic of 
Falkenhayn that he was nearly court-
martialled.
 The operational perspective 
of the official historians therefore 
provided the ammunition with 
which Der Weltkr ieg  a t tacked 
Falkenhayn. Holger Afflerbach’s 
political biography, Falkenhayn. 
Politisches Denken und Handeln im 
Kaiserreich (1994), provides important 
correctives. Falkenhayn’s operational 
efforts need to be set in their political 
context. They were accompanied 
by a sustained attempt to prise the 
Entente apart, but his efforts to 
persuade Russia to negotiate were 
incompatible with the predilections 
of either Germany’s principal ally, 
Austria-Hungary, or of Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff. For them, the 
weight applied to Russia in 1915 
should be directly military, not 
diplomatic. Hindenburg’s iconic role 
as a national hero created a political 
leverage which ultimately neither the 
chancellor, Theodor von Bethmann 
Hollweg, nor the Kaiser could resist. 
 It has been argued that Der 
Weltkrieg was written to glorify 
Hindenburg  and (espec ia l ly ) 
Ludendorff, just as it has been said 
(wrongly, as Andrew Green shows) 
that Edmonds used the British official 
history to defend Douglas 
Haig. In 1917-18, Haeften had 
worked on propaganda in the 
German supreme command, 
Oberste Heeresleitung III. But 
after the war Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff kept their 
distance from the work of the 
Reichsarchiv, and Der Weltkrieg 
barely mentioned Hindenburg 
in its account of the events of 
1918. Wolfgang Foerster, who 
succeeded Haeften in 1934 as 
the director of what was now 
called the Forschungsanstalt für 
Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, 
was better disposed towards 
Ludendorff. He treated the 
victory at Tannenberg, whose 
site was both a focus for the 
commemoration of the First 
World War and a memorial to 
Hindenburg after his death, as 
a “model battle,” on a par with 
the great German victories of 
Leipzig in 1813 and Sedan in 
1870. But the lesson from all three 
cases was that the use of envelopment 
as an operational method had led 
to a decisive victory. So the real 
influence on Foerster was not so 
much Ludendorff as Schlieffen. In 
1921, he had published Graf Schlieffen 
und der Weltkrieg, a book designed 
to show how Schlieffen’s legacy 
had shaped Germany’s conduct 
of the war. The combination of 
Ludendorff’s right-wing radicalism 
and mental instability increasingly 
alienated him from his former 
General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief 
of the General Staff of the Field Army 
and head of the OHL.
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Hew Strachan is the Chichele 
Professor of the History of War, 
University of Oxford.
colleagues on the general staff in 
general and from the Reichsarchiv in 
particular. The authors employed 
on Der Weltkrieg never subjected 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the 
sort of psychological profiling that 
they accorded to their predecessors, 
Moltke and Falkenhayn, but in 1952 
Foerster published an independent 
s t u d y  o f  L u d e n d o r f f ’ s 
“psychological state in the 
final stages of the First World 
War,” Der Feldherr Ludendorff im 
Unglück, in 1952. 
 Most of the papers which 
went into the writing of Der 
Weltkrieg were destroyed when 
the Royal Air Force bombed 
the depository in which the 
Prussian military archives 
were stored in 1945. This is 
the single most compelling 
reason for according the utmost 
seriousness to this book. Unlike 
the official histories of the other 
major belligerents of the First 
World War, that of Germany 
can never be written again, or 
at least not from a comparable 
primary source base. However, 
the military papers of the other 
states of imperial Germany 
have survived, and so too have 
collections of private papers 
belonging to those involved 
in the writing of Der Weltkrieg. 
Most importantly the papers 
which were still the subject 
of active investigation by the 
official historians were kept 
elsewhere and so not destroyed 
in 1945. Having been stored in 
Potsdam in the Cold War, they 
have now been united with the 
military archives in Freiburg. From 
these it is clear that many facets of 
Germany’s war effort other than 
the operational level of its conduct 
interested the Reichsarchiv and its 
successors. Although the volumes of 
Der Weltkrieg are Eurocentric, theatres 
outside Europe were covered briefly 
and were due to be the subject of 
individual studies. Ludwig Boell’s 
monumental history of the East 
African campaign, completed in 
1944, was effectively recreated by 
its author after the war, and then 
privately published. Most weighty 
were the projected volumes of the 
economic history of the war, of which 
only the first, pre-war volumes, ever 
appeared.
 Mark Humphries,  John 
Maker  and their  team of 
t r a n s l a t o r s ,  W i l h l e m  J . 
Kiesselbach, Peter Meinlschmidt 
and Ralph Whitehead, are to 
be congratulated on a major 
achievement. The year 1915 
marked the moment when the 
fighting on the western front 
adapted to trench warfare, 
and when the armies of all 
s ides  began what  recent 
British military historians have 
described as a “learning curve.” 
This process was of course not 
a uniquely British phenomenon, 
but one in which Germans 
and French also shared, and to 
whose development the battles 
at Soissons and Neuve Chapelle, 
the gas attack at Ypres, and 
the offensives in Champagne 
and Artois all contributed. 
This volume will transform 
English-speaking historians’ 
understandings of a crucial 
stage in the First World War. It 
might even make Germans take 
their own operational military 
history seriously.
German soldiers with a rudimentary gas 
mask, circa 1915.
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